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GRAND JURY DISCRIMINATION AND
THE MEXICAN AMERICAN
I INTRODUCTION
While numerous commentaries have directed attention and analysis
to the constitutional proscription of petit and grand jury discrimina-
tion against the Negro,1 there has been an astonishing dearth of le-
gal comment concerning the discriminatory exclusion and inadequate
representation of the Spanish surnamed Mexican American2 on the
1. See Gibson, Racial Discrimination on Grand Juries, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 29 (1950);
Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1968); Comment,
The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HAST. L.J. 1417 (1969);
Comment, Discrimination in the Selection of Grand Juries: Theory and Practice, 29
TEXAS L. Rav. 817 (1951); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1948).
2. The terms "Mexican American" and "Spanish surname" will be used inter-
changeably in this Comment in an attempt to utilize and follow the statistical com-
pilations and Mexican American reports introduced herein. In an effort to estab-
lish consistency with the Bureau of Census this Comment will adopt the definition of
Mexican American as white persons with Spanish surnames. Non-white persons
with Spanish surnames such as Indians, Negroes, Filipinos and other non-white races
are not included in the analysis set forth.
In both the 1950 and 1960 census, persons of Spanish surname were identified as
part of the general coding operation. In processing the 1960 census schedules, coders
classified all persons, regardless of race, as having a Spanish or a non-Spanish surname.
For this purpose, the coders used a list of approximately 7,000 Spanish surnames com-
piled originally by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Additional names
of apparent Spanish origin were referred to specialists trained to differentiate Spanish
surnames from surnames in other Romance languages, such as Portuguese, French and
Italian. While persons of all races with Spanish surnames were identified, only white
persons with Spanish surnames were included in the Census Bureau's report. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960
SUBJECT REPORTS-PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME viii-ix (1963). The Census
Bureau also compiled a special tabulation by race based on a five-percent sam-
ple of all persons of Spanish surname. It was found that in California, 97.5
percent of all persons with Spanish surnames were of white races, 1.2 percent were
Filipinos, 0.4 percent were Indians, and 0.9 percent were of other races. Id. at 202.
The Census Bureau stated that its objective in identifying persons of Spanish surname
was considerably more than the mere identification of persons of Mexican birth
or parentage already available from the questions on birthplace of the respondent
and of his parents. It involves an attempt to identify the third and later generations
of such immigrants as well as the descendants of Spanish Colonial inhabitants
of the Southwest. Id. at ix.
For purposes of this Comment the term Chicano will not be used interchangeably
with Spanish surnamed, or Mexican American. In the most recent challenge to the
grand jury, People v. Ramirez, Crim. No. A244906 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County,
March 31, 1971), defendants used the term Chicano as descriptive of the class that had
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petit and grand jury. The relevant legal principles have evolved only
through an exhaustive array of constitutional challenges advanced by
the Negro and founded upon Fourteenth Amendment due process
and equal protection tenets.' Recently, however, the attack has been
been under-represented from the grand jury. Testimony was introduced to show the
existence of such a class. Record at 51-64, People v. Ramirez, Crim. No. A244906
(Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, March 31, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Ramirez
Record]. The court found that the term Chicano was not an ethnic term as promul-
gated in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954). The court also found
that Chicano is a social movement which began in 1966, that no statistical evidence
is available to support testimony introduced as to how large or who is in this
movement, and that the evidence did not establish an identifiable class known
as Chicanos. People v. Ramirez, Crim. No. A244906 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles
County, March 31, 1971), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 8-9.
It has been recognized that Chicano is a self-designating term and consequently
persons who wish to use this term cannot be discovered by any visual identification.
The rapid spread of chicanismo should not be taken to mean that a full blown social
movement is in progress among Mexican Americans, for chicanismo poses a very
difficult dilemma for most older Mexican Americans. They sympathize with the mo-
tives of the movement but fear that the radical means used to pursue the goals
intended will undermine their own hard-earned social and economic gains. J.
MooRE, THE MxmcAN AMERICANS 148-56 (1970). One writer notes that Chicano
could not be defined by La Raza writers, except by what it is not. S. STEINER, LA
RAZA: THE MacA, AvmRiCANS 243 (1970). In an interview conducted by the author
of this Comment with the only Chicano who sat on the 1971 Los Angeles County
Grand Jury, Miss Lydia Lopez [hereinafter cited as Interview], the question was posed:
What reaction did the 1971 grand jury have to your self-designation as a Chicano?
Miss Lopez responded:
They really don't like it. They like Mexican American. I see that as rather
difficult. I do not see myself as a 100% American. I have not been able to
benefit in all America has to offer and neither have many of my people.
Because my people as a class have not been able to, I cannot. A lot of our
people are still discriminated against and I cannot really feel that we are yet
able to enjoy everything here. Unless all the people can enjoy this-then I cannot.
The Chicano grand juror viewed the grand jury composition as a political extension of
the selector-judges. Therefore, barring a major change in their political thinking, the
only Chicanos that would ever be nominated to the grand jury would be either token or
the consequence of community pressure. The Chicano grand juror summed up her
experience on the grand jury in these words: "the ten dollar token."
There is, therefore, a subjective distinction between a Mexican American and a
Chicano. While it is foreseeable that Mexican Americans of the higher economic
echelon will be nominated to the grand jury system, it is not readily foreseeable that Chi-
canos will be nominated under our present system of selection. Therefore, the term
Chicano cannot accurately reflect the statistics and testimony presented in this Comment.
3. See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Arnold v. North Carolina,
376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559 (1953); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 254 U.S. 587 (1935); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110
(1882); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880).
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levied by the Mexican American, and the Los Angeles County grand jury
selection process has provided the current source of the constitutional
dispute.4
Mexican American exclusion and discrimination, in the context of
the grand jury system, has been recognized in the Southwest since
1954.1 The high proportional disparity that in fact exists between
the size of the Mexican American population and their numerical rep-
resentation in Los Angeles County jury service is the current source of
controversy.0 Although the Spanish surnamed population of Los An-
geles County has increased from 6.93 percent of the total population
in 1950 to approximately 14 percent in 1971,1 only 3.6 percent of
the grand jury nominees from 1959 through 1972 have been Spanish
surnamed. As such, only 8 out of a total of 302 persons actually
serving on the grand jury were of Spanish surname.'
This Comment will investigate the underlying causes of this eg-
regious proportional disparity. The Los Angeles County grand jury
selection process will be analyzed to determine whether it has pro-
moted an intentional exclusion, 9 a systematic exclusion, 0 or merely
4. People v. Castro, Crim. No. A232902 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, January
9, 1969), writ of prohibition granted in part and denied in part sub. nom., Castro v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1970) (grand jury issue not de-
cided); People v. Montez, Crim. No. A224906 (Super. CL Los Angeles County, Oct. 27,
1969), writ of prohibition or in the alternative a writ to hear motion to quash the indict-
ment de novo granted sub. nom., Montez v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 343, 88
Cal. Rptr. 736 (1970), remanded sub. nom., (People v. Ramirez, Crim. No. A244906
Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, March 31, 1971), writ of prohibition denied, Ramirez
v. Superior Court, 2d Civ. 38508 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., June 1, 1971), petition for
hearing denied, 2d Civ. 38508 (Cal. Supp. Ct., June 14, 1971).
5. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). See also Montoya v. People, 141
Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. See notes 100 and 107 infra and accompanying text.
8. This information regarding nominees and members of the grand juries from 1959
through 1969 was obtained by the Los Angeles County Jury Commissioner on order of
the court, Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 93, and is on file at the offices of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Similar information for the 1970 through
1972 grand juries was obtained from Los Angeles Superior Court Grand Jury
Nominee Lists and Final Grand Jury Member lists on file at the Administra-
tive Offices, Superior Court, Los Angeles County. All lists were compared with
LIsT oF SPANiSH SuiAmES (rev. ed. 1963) (on file at the Bureau of the Census
Library, Federal Building, West Los Angeles).
9. For purposes of this Comment, intentional exclusion is defined as either exclusion
by a statute that is unconstitutional on its face, or exclusion by a conscious design of
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a chance exclusion"1 of the Mexican American. The constitutional im-
plications of each type of exclusion, the exclusion's effect on a defend-
ant and the corresponding sociological impact upon the excluded groups
will be explored. If the method of exclusion is found to be constitu-
tionally prohibited, and until it is corrected, indicted Mexican Ameri-
cans have been and will continue to be denied equal protection and
due process of law no matter how strong the showing of substantive
evidence sustaining the indictment. 2
I. HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF THE GRAND JURY
The grand jury incipiated at common law13 and from the common
law developed its current function in this country as an investigating,
informing and accusing body. 4 It investigates ex parte, appropriate
complaints of wrongdoing in order to determine on the basis of the
evidence presented whether prima facie grounds for criminal prosecu-
tion exist.15 The California grand jury, not unlike its counterparts in
the officers in charge of jury selection in the shadow of a statute constitutional on its
face. See notes 36-51 and accompanying text infra.
10. For purposes of this Comment, systematic exclusion is defined as (1) intentional
exclusion as defined in note 9 supra, or (2) an unconstitutional total or partial ex-
clusion by selectors in the exercise of their discretionary application of selection pro-
cedure, the result of which bespeaks discrimination over a period of time, whether
"ingenious or ingenuous." This concept will best be illustrated by the textual progres-
sion of cases contained herein. See text accompanying notes 55-80 infra.
11. For purposes of this Comment, chance exclusion is defined as the laws of prob-
ability at work in the disparity between the constitutionally protected group in the
community and their number on the grand or petit jury lists. Chance exclusion is the
result of myriad social factors and the interplay of elements of happenstance with-
out apparent cause or design. Of course, chance exclusion is not constitutionally
prohibited.
12. See, e.g., Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana,
356 U.S. 584 (1958); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
13. See Kennedy & Briggs, Historical and Legal Aspects of the California Grand
Jury System, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 251 (1955), and Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury
System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 101 (1931), for discussions of the history of the grand jury.
14. See EDwARDs, THE GRAND JURY 2 (1906); STEPHENSON & MARCHAM, SOURCES
OF ENGLISH CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 77 (1937). Cf. Vukasin, The Grand Jury, 34
CAL. STATE B.J. 436, 438-39 (1959):
Upon the creation of our country, a grand jury was put into the hands of each
of the states and the federal government. Within each, its growth depended on
the grand jurors and their understanding and enthusiasm, the quirks of related
government officials . . . and the interest of citizens. Strong, effective jurymen,
reflecting an interested citizenry caused this institution to become a very useful
instrument of local government. Ineffective juries, apathetic citizens, and domi-
nating public officials produced grand juries which retard justice or else 'rubber
stamped' for the public prosecutor.
15. See 38 CJ.S. Grand Juries § 1 (1943); 38 AM. JuR. 2d Grand Juries § 1 (1968).
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other states, is defined as: "A body of the required number of persons
returned from the citizens of the county before a court of competent
jurisdiction, and sworn to inquire of public offenses committed or triable
within the county." 6 The investigatory duties of California grand juries
include inquiry into the misconduct in office of public officers of every
description within the county,17 examination of the accounts and rec-
ords of every county office,"" and investigation of the requests of all
county officers. 19
There are two basic methods employed in the selection of grand jur-
ies.20 The first involves jury commissioners who compile lists from vari-
ous sources and who ultimately select the grand jury.2 The sec-
ond procedure involves judges of the general trial court who select
the grand jury either from lists supplied to them by jury boards, or
from their own nominations.2 2  Combinations of these two modes of
selection have developed to include systems under which jury commis-
sioners assemble a list of qualified potential grand jurors and then
present the list to the judges for final selection.2 3
California incorporates variations of both types of selection proce-
dures depending upon the population of the county in question.24  Spe-
16. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 888 (West 1970). The California grand jury has been de-
scribed to be
endowed with broad powers as an inquisitorial and judicial body, but enjoined to
exercise those powers with mature discretion. It is not to engage in 'fishing
expeditions,' that is, initiate investigations not specifically enjoined upon it without
probable cause, nor is it to attempt to act as a supervising administrative agency
controlling the discretionary activities of public officers. Kennedy & Briggs,
Historical and Legal Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 43 CALi. L.
REv. 251, 267 (1955).
17. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 919(c) (West 1970).
18. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 925 (West 1970).
19. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 928 (West 1970).
20. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-9-5 (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1251
(1962).
21. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-9-8 (1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.1304
(Supp. 1971); N.Y. JuIcIARY LAw ANN. § 594 (McKinney 1968).
22. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-148 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1251
(1962).
23. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.09 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 78, §§ 24-25
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971). Another variation is N.Y. JuDICiARY LAw ANN. § 591 (Mc-
Kinney 1968).
24. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 204(a) (West 1967). In counties having a
population of over 60,000, a majority of the judges of the superior court of that county
may at their discretion appoint a jury commissioner to assist them in making selections
of trial and grand jurors of that county. The judges or jury commissioners are free to
employ any source from which to select nominees for grand jury service. However,
judges are not required to choose any names from the list returned by the jury com-
missioner, but may at their discretion make nominations from any source regardless of
the list returned by the jury commissioners. When the list is returned, the judges by
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cifically, the Los Angeles County Superior Court Rules prescribe the
method to be used in obtaining Los Angeles County grand jurors.2"
The grand jury is to be drawn and impaneled once every calendar year
by the presiding judge.26 On or before the first court day in Septem-
ber of each year individual judges may nominate two people of their
choosing, and the names of the nominees are to be put on a preliminary
jury list. Nominees must meet certain provisions of the Penal and Civil
Codes.2 7  The entire list is then distributed to the judges and opened to
public inspection.28 After a process of inspection and investigation is
completed by the jury commissioner, the majority of the judges vote,
to select a grand jury list of thirty-four nominees.2 9 From this list,
the county clerk selects the twenty-three members by a drawing held
in January of each year."
The ideal sought is "[a] body truly representative of the commu-
nity."31  However, recent studies of the California grand jury have
revealed that this is not the case.3 2  These studies have indicated
that prospective grand jurors are selected on the basis of either
majority vote select such persons as in their opinion should serve on the grand jury.
CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 903.1, 903.3, 903.4 (West 1970).
25. Los ANGELES CoUNTY SUPER CT. R. 29.
26. Id. § 1.
27. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 198, 199 (West 1967); CAL. PEN. CODE § 893, as
amended Ch. 856 § 1.3 [1971] Cal. Stat. 1748; CAL. PEN. CODE § 893.5, added by
Ch. 856 § 1.7 [1971] Cal. Stat. 1749.
A person to be eligible for service as a grand juror must be a citizen of the United
States, 21 or older and a resident of the county for one year. He must be of sound mind
and ordinary intelligence and have a sufficient knowledge of English. He must not be
serving on a trial jury or have been discharged as a grand juror within one year of selec-
tion. He cannot have been convicted of malfeasance in office or any felony and cannot
be serving as a public officer.
28. Los ANGELES COUNTY SUPER. Or. R. 29 §§ 4-6 provide in greater detail that the
presiding judge then appoints a "Committee on Selection of Grand Jurors." The county
jury commissioner then makes interviews and investigations of the nominees, as are
appropriate. Objections can be made against nominees by any judge or other person.
A written confidential report on all nominees remaining is presented to the presiding
judge on or before November 30.
29. On or before December 10, all judges of the court meet, and those nominees
who are approved by the majority of the judges will be placed upon and will constitute
the grand jury list. Los ANGELES COUNTY SUPER. Or. R. 29-6(b).
30. SUPER. Or. LOS ANGELES CoUNTr, FINAL GRAND JURY LIST, released as a public
record the first week of January each year.
31. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
32. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOuTHwEsT, A STUDY OF GRAND JURY SERVICE BY PER-
SONS OF SPANISH SURNAME AND BY INDIANS IN SELECTED CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 STUDY]; Comment, Some Aspects of the California Grand
Jury System, 8 STAN. L. REV. 631, 637-38 (1956).
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personal acquaintance with the judge or recommendations received
from persons with whom the judge is acquainted. 38 Given these
methods of selection, it is not surprising that the average California grand
jury tends to be composed of above-average-income white Anglo
Americans. 34  While it is difficult to determine whether the judge-
selectors consciously excluded minority persons, it appears that they
failed to take adequate steps to acquaint themselves with minority
groups in the population.35 The resultant exclusion of Mexican Ameri-
cans from the Los Angeles County grand jury thus raises serious con-
stitutional questions.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF RACIAL
EXCLUSION FROM GRAND JURIES
In 1880 the Supreme Court established that any statutory or syste-
matic exclusion of persons from jury service solely because of their
racial or ethnic background contravenes the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.36 This protection has subsequently been
extended to include cases where a long and continued disparity be-
tween the number of an identifiable group in the general population
and the number serving on the jury is shown.3 7 However, there is no ob-
jective test with which to determine what period constitutes a long and
continued disparity,3" or how great a proportional disparity must exist
to require remedial action in order to comply with constitutional dictates.
An analysis of the major cases in this area is crucial to an understanding
of both these issues and the theory employed to challenge the composi-
33. 1970 STUDY, supra note 32.
34. Comment, Some Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 8 STAN. L. REV.
631, 637-38 (1956). In most portions of the Southwest, the term Anglo American is
used as a catchall expression to designate all persons who are neither Indian, Mexican,
Negro or Asian. The term Anglo American does not define a homogeneous entity, it
defines a relationship. Since two or more ethnic groups constitute an ethnic system, one
ethnic group always implies the existence of another. The dichotomy implied in the
terms Anglo American and Mexican American is real enough, no matter how vague
either term may be as descriptive of the heterogeneous elements making up the two
categories.
35. See text accompanying notes 162-176 infra.
36. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1880).
37. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Labat v. Bennett,
365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
38. See text accompanying notes 138-142 infra for definitions of "long and continued
disparity".
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tion of the grand jury in Los Angeles County.39
A. De Jure, De Facto and Systematic Exclusion
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in
part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . an impartial jury. . . ." The Framers of the Constitu-
tion intended the words "impartial jury" to mean all the essential ele-
ments of a jury trial which were then recognized in this country and
at common law.40  However, the Sixth Amendment was then applicable
only to the federal government. 4' Thus, challenges to the imparti-
ality of state petit or grand juries were not raised prior to the Civil
War, since the states were not restricted by the present constitutional
guarantees of equal protection or due process. As a result, during
the pre-Civil War Period many states lawfully enacted legislation which
in effect denied the black man the right to participate in the adminis-
tration of the government and its laws. These statutes usually excluded
Negroes and other non-whites from serving as jurors,4 2 from being wit-
nesses against a white man, 43 or from voting.
44
The post-Civil War Period witnessed congressional legislation de-
39. See text accompanying notes 120-152 infra for a statistical analysis of the Los
Angeles Grand Jury.
40. R. PouND, TNT DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GuA.ANTErs OF LminRTY
75-76 (1956). In United States v. Aaron Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (No. 14, 692g)
(C.C.D. Va. 1807), Chief Justice Marshall opined:
The great value of the trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness and im-
partiality. Those who most prize the institution, prize it because it furnishes a
tribunal which may be expected to be uninfluenced by an undue bias of the mind.
I have always conceived, and still conceive, an impartial jury as required by the
common law, and as secured by the constitution....
41. See Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 (1890); Twitchell v. Penn-
sylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868). In 1928 Chief Justice Taft restated this posi-
tion with what seemed to be finality in Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 85 (1928):
mhe Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not apply to the
trial of criminal prosecutions by a State. It has been well settled for years that
the first ten Amendments apply only to the procedure and trial of causes in the
federal courts and are not limitations upon those in state courts.
However, the gradual incorporation of the bill of rights into the Due Process Clause
has partially erased this distinction. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the Court noted the text of a
West Virginia statute, which provided that all white males of the State would be liable
for jury service.
43. See, e.g., Ch. 42, § 1, [18531 Ind. Stat. 60 (repealed 1881); see also People v.
Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) for the court's consideration of an excellent judicial analysis
of the physical and mental attributes of non-whites in California in 1854.
44. In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 376-77 (1880), the Court observed that
Delaware had an interesting device to exclude Negroes from jury service. Chapter 109
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signed to protect the newly freed man from the harsh laws that dis-
criminated against him in many states.45 Elements of Congress, un-
satisfied with the Civil Rights Act of 1866,46 lobbied for a constitu-
tional amendment that would secure new rights for the Negro. A guar-
antee similar to the Sixth Amendment's requirement of an "impartial
jury" was among the new rights sought against the states.47
With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Enabling
Clause thereof4" became the focal point in the next phase of the
struggle. Pursuant to the Enabling Clause, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 187549 which provided a cause of action in cases
of grand jury racial exclusion.5" Subsequently, a series of Supreme
Court decisions which were founded upon equal protection and due
process of law grounds invalidated various state statutes excluding
Negroes from jury systems.51
A basic distinction derived from the Court's consideration of ra-
cial exclusion from jury service is one of de jure and de facto exclu-
sion.52 De jure exclusion denotes discrimination emanating from
of the Revised Statutes of 1853 contained the jury law of February 28, 1849, and pro-
vided that all persons qualified to vote at the general election and to be electors shall be
liable to serve as jurors. However, section 1 of article IV of the Delaware Constitution
(1831) declared that "[in general elections] every free white male citizen . . . shall
enjoy the right to be an elector...." By negative inference, Negroes were excluded
from such a right.
45. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6-1861 (1865).
46. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
47. The words in the Sixth Amendment were on the minds of both opponents and
proponents of the amendment, as well as were other provisions of the first eight amend-
ments. See Rep. Andrew J. Rodger's understanding of section 1 of the proposed
amendment in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2538 (1865); Senator Jacob M.
Howard's speech to the Senate in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2539 (1865).
48. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article".
49. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 336, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 243
(1970).
50. Section 4 of the Act provided in part that:
[N]o citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by
law shall be disqualified for service as [a] grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude; and any officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection
or summoning of jurors who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the
cause aforesaid shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and be fined not more than five thousand dollars.
51. Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
52. The distinction between de facto and de lure exclusion, as termed herein, arose
from the remedy set forth in the federal removal statute. The Act of Dec. 1, 1873,
tit. xiii, ch. 7, § 641, 18 Rev. Stat. 115, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970), de-
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state action in the form of a statute unconstitutional on its face. For
the most part, however, such statutes have been litigated into non-exist-
ence in the jury selection area. On the other hand, de facto exclu-
sion, or what has now been termed "systematic exclusion," remains all
too prevalent. It results from the unconstitutional application of a
statute constitutional on its face. Due to the problems inherent in es-
tablishing such an unconstitutional application, 5 the Court has at-
dlared that when any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any state
court, for any cause whatsoever, against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in
the judicial tribunals of the state any right secured to him by any law providing for the
equal civil rights to citizens of the United States, such suit or prosecution may, upon the
petition of such defendants filed in said state court, at any time before the trial or final
hearing of the cause, stating the facts and verified by oath, be removed, for trial into
the circuit court. Petitions for removal founded on statutes prohibiting Negro jury
service are required to show that the express operation of the statute in question ren-
ders it impossible to obtain an impartial trial and therefore denies equal protection of
the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In such an instance the case may
be removed to the United States district court.
However, as the Court noted in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), the re-
moval statute does not apply to all cases in which the equal protection of the laws may
be denied to a defendant. Mr. Justice Field, concurring, stated:
The denial of rights or the inability to enforce them, to which this section
refers, is, in my opinion such as arises from legislative action of the State, as, for
example, an act excluding colored persons from being witnesses, making contracts,
acquiring property and the like. Id. at 333.
It is insufficient if a defendant merely alleges a belief that he is unable to enforce his
rights at a subsequent stage of a proceeding. Id. at 320. In the absence of an ex-
press state constitutional or legislative impediment, he cannot prior to trial absolutely
assert that his civil rights are denied. Id. The Court found no congressional intent to
authorize a removal where jury commissioners or other subordinate officers had ex-
cluded non-white citizens from juries because of race without express authority derived
from the Constitution or laws of the state. In the absence of exclusion by statutory
language, as contrasted to exclusion by statutory operation, removal would be denied.
Id. at 322. However, as Mr. Justice Field noted, if Negro defendants were deprived of
the equal protection of the laws by total exclusion of members of their race from
selection, a remedy could be had before the Court. But the appropriate remedy was
the ordinary judicial review of a federal question rather than statutory removal.
If an executive or judicial officer exercises power with which he is not invested
by law. . . . [then] [tihe action-in such a case, where the rights of a citizen
under laws of the United States are disregarded, may be reviewed and corrected or
reversed by this court. . . . It is merely the ordinary case of an erroneous ruling
of an inferior tribunal. Id. at 334.
53. The grounds affording reversal on the basis of systematic exclusion revolve
around the question of whether the burden of proof needed to sustain an allegation of
unconstitutional application of an otherwise valid statute is met. The burden is often
difficult to meet and the degree of proof required is uncertain where state laws have
granted discretion in the administration of the jury laws and the challenge is founded
on evidence purporting to establish that this discretion as exercised results in a denial
to the Negro of the right to be selected to state juries.
Thus, in Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), an order denying a motion
to quash an indictment was upheld. The Court found that the laws of the state "do
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tempted to formulate a workable criterion or standard to determine
the existence of systematic exclusion.
The "systematic exclusion rule" which has evolved proceeds upon a
theory which recognizes the probability of prejudice to a petitioner-
member of a group that has been the traditional object of oppression.
Thus, when this group is arbitrarily excluded from jury service, the
petitioner need not show actual prejudice.5 4  However, the degree
of exclusion necessary to invoke the systematic exclusion rule neces-
sarily presents problems of uncertainty and diversity in application.
In response, the Supreme Court has fashioned the "prima facie" case
which is intended to aid in effectuating the systematic exclusion
theory.
B. The Prima Facie Case
The concept of systematic exclusion from the jury system has neces-
sarily evolved from the Court's interpretation of the laws of chance. 55
The Court has adopted an intuitive "I know it when I see it"56
approach rather than articulating a definite standard for detecting
unconstitutional discrimination. While it has been recognized that
not on their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been shown that their
actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them." Id. at 225.
The Williams Court held that petitioners had failed to meet the burden of proof needed
to show the unconstitutional application of statutes constitutional on their face. Id. at
222-23. More than probability or opportunity for unconstitutional application must be
shown to sustain a contention of racial exclusion from juries by state or county offi-
cials. A showing of actual unconstitutional administration of such statutes is neces-
sary. Id. at 224-25. If the statute does not on its face discriminate against Negroes
because of race or color, the application of the law has to be shown to be the same as
if it had been written in the statutes. See text accompanying notes 59-60 infra.
The petitioner in Williams offered no statistical evidence and did not allege that state
action deprived him of equal protection. The only evidence submitted were four
affidavits. 170 U.S. at 222-23. Cf. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (claim of
exclusion upheld where petitioner offered statistical evidence in support of the allega-
tion of total exclusion and the state failed to introduce rebuttal evidence).
54. Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HAST.
L. J. 1417, 1434 (1969). See text accompanying notes 131-42 infra. Note, Jury
Challenges, Capital Punishment, and Labat v. Bennett: A Reconciliation, 1968 DUKE
L. J. 283, 300-01.
55. See Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Ruv. 235, 251 &
n. 67. "'[]t taxes our credibility to say that mere chance resulted in there being no
members of this class among the over six thousand jurors called in the past twenty-
five years.'" Id., quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954).
56. Compare the Court's approach in the obscenity area. In attempting to formulate
a definition of "obscenity," Justice Stewart stated: "I shall not today attempt further to
define [obscene material] ... . But I know it when I see it. .. ." Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
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the Constitution does not require proportionate jury representation of
racial and economic groups,5 7 the equal protection mandate does
demand that the system of grand jury nomination not be employed
to intentionally exclude such groups from the selection process.58
And although the Court has repetitiously deemed unconstitutional ex-
clusion to be synonymous with intentional exclusion, 9 the element
of intent or consciousness that is constitutionally prohibited need not
be directly established but may be inferred from a showing of a long
and continued egregious disparity between the proportion of the class
nominated for jury duty and the proportion of the class eligible in the
population."0 This inference has been judicially termed a "prima
facie showing" which dispenses with the insurmountable burden of es-
tablishing actual intent to discriminate. Upon presenting the prima
facie case the burden is shifted to the state.61
57. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,
286-87 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945).
58. Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 711-13 (5th Cir. 1966), and cases cited therein.
59. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
60. See Carmical v. Craven, 451 F.2d 399, 404 (9th Cir. 1971) ("clear thinking"
test resulted in exclusion of identifiable classes of veniremen and was sufficient to con-
stitute a prima facie case of unconstitutional jury selection):
When a jury selection system actually results in master jury panels from which
identifiable classes are grossly excluded, the subjective intent of those who develop
and enforce the system is immaterial .... The lack of specific intent to dis-
criminate . . . cannot offset the grossly discriminatory effect of . . . [the] jury
selection process.
See text accompanying notes 64-79 infra.
61. Cf. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880), where the Supreme Court held that
the selectors' contentions that the black race in Delaware was utterly disqualified by
want of intelligence, experience or moral integrity to sit on juries was a "violent pre-
sumption." Id. at 397. Such a presumption of disqualification could not rebut peti-
tioner's showing that while there was a sizeable number of Negroes in the state, none
had ever served on the grand jury. Id.
The concept of a prima facie showing was further articulated in Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935), where it was charged that there was a long, continued, systematic
and arbitrary exclusion of qualified Negro citizens from jury service solely because of
their race or color, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 591. Peti-
tioners first presented evidence establishing the presence of a substantial number of
Negroes in the county. Statistics were introduced comparing the number of Negroes to
the total population. Id. at 590. Second, testimony from various citizens in the
community revealed that Negroes had been totally excluded from jury service. Id. at
591. On this showing alone the Court found that the "testimony in itself made out a
prima facie case of the denial of equal protection which the Constitution guarantees."
Id. The Court further considered direct testimony nonessential to the prima facie
case indicating that various Negroes were qualified for grand jury service. Id. The
showing could not be rebutted by the jury commissioners' testimony indicating a failure
to appropriately consider the qualifications of Negroes, (Id. at 592-95) and the Court, in
holding for petitioners, found that the practice of the jury commissioners denied peti-
tioners the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 596.
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Developed from cases involving total exclusions, 2 the prima facie
case has since adapted its statistical presentation to claims of partial ex-
clusion.63 In Smith v. Texas,64 evidence was introduced to show that Ne-
groes constituted 20 percent of the population of the county, yet from
1931 to 1938 only three individual Negroes out of 18 called had sat on
Norris v. Alabama firmly established the burden of proof required to present
a prima facie case of unconstitutional jury exclusion. The indications first ex-
pounded in Neal over fifty years earlier were clarified. These indications were (1) that
a substantial number of Negroes lived in the state, and (2) that these Negroes had
never been summoned to serve in the state courts. It can be assumed from the Su-
preme Court's opinion that the sufficiency of the evidence presented by petitioner could
not have been rebutted by any state showing. Building upon the Neal Court's indica-
tions of the prima facie showing necessary to sustain an allegation of racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection (103 U.S. at 397), the Court in Norris held that a statistical show-
ing of the existence of a substantial proportion of Negroes in the county, combined
with testimonial evidence of total exclusion from jury service, presented a prima facie
case of the denial of equal protection. As a result, the burden was shifted to the
state.
62. The fact that the exclusion was total in Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935), put a heavier burden on the state to overcome the prima facie case because
the inference drawn from such an exclusion would invariably be that the exclusion is
based on race or color. See, e.g., Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955); Avery v.
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
However, other nonracial factors that may have operated to virtually exclude
Negroes from juries were not prohibited, since an "obvious and overwhelming"
inference could not be drawn when there had been a small number of Negroes
called or selected on the juries in question. Therefore, if Negroes had been called for
service at one time or another, the Court would not infer systematic exclusion by reason
of race or color. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969); Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Ark.
1965); Seals v. State, 282 Ala. 586, 213 So. 2d 645 (1968); Butler v. State, 285 Ala.
387, 232 So. 2d 631 (1970); State v. Copeland, 255 La. 91, 229 So. 2d 710 (1969).
63. For seven decades following the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
only cases reversed by the Supreme Court in the area of racial exclusion from jury
service were those of total exclusion. However, in Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939), the Court found that a prima facie case of systematic exclusion had been pre-
sented even though the names of three Negroes appeared on the venire list. Only one
of the three had been called within memory of the trial court. A venire of 300 in
December of 1936 contained the names of three Negroes, one of whom was then
dead, one of whom was listed by the wrong name, and the third of whom was called for
petit jury service in January 1937. He was the only Negro who had ever been called
for jury service within the memory of the Clerk of the Court, the Sheriff or any other
witness who testified. Id. at 359. The Louisiana Supreme Court had found that Ne-
groes had been excluded from jury service not on account of race or color, but rather on
account of the laws prescribing jury selection. Id. The Court did not agree and held, as
in cases of total exclusion, that the state had failed to overcome the prima facie case with
direct and appropriate evidence. Id. at 361-62. The Court observed further that peti-
tioner's testimony was not challenged by appropriate evidence. If there had been direct
and specific evidence obtainable to overcome the prima facie showing, the Court
assumed the state would not have refrained from using it. Id.
64. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
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the grand jury.65 The Court found an unconstitutional exclusion on the
grounds that
[c]hance and accident alone could hardly have brought about the list-
ing for grand jury service of so few Negroes from among the thou-
sands shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifi-
cations for jury service. 66
The Smith Court recognized for the first time that a statistical disparity
was strong proof of class discrimination. 67  The statistical evidence
introduced in Smith led the Court to eliminate "chance" as the cause
of the startling disparity between the number of Negroes in the county
and those called for jury service. The Court had thus attempted to
distinguish systematic exclusion from chance exclusion. The former,
of course, was constitutionally prohibited, while the latter apparently
was not. However, it. must be assumed that only the Court's intui-
tion was employed in applying the laws of probability since the opin-
ion fails to indicate the mathematical basis for the final determination
of unconstitutional exclusion.
In later cases of partial exclusion, efforts to establish a prima
facie showing of denial of equal protection were increasingly subject
to state rebuttal as the disparity decreased. In Whitus v. Georgia,66
statistical evidence indicated that 21.7 percent of the eligible jurors in the
county were Negro, while only 9.1 percent of the grand jury venire
were Negro. 69  The Court noted that this disparity was sufficient to
shift the burden to the state, 7 and Georgia failed to meet the burden of
overcoming the prima facie case.71  In Jones v. Georgia,72 it was
shown that 19.7 percent of the Negroes in the county were eligible
jurors, while only 5 percent of the jury lists contained Negroes. 71 One
Negro was included in the panel of grand jurors which had indicted the
petitioner. 4 From the evidence presented, the Court found that a
prima facie case had been established and held:
[T]he burden upon the State to explain "the disparity between the
65. Id. at 129. Only five of the 534 grand jurors who served from 1931 to 1938
were Negro. One Negro served three times and thus there were only three individual
Negroes in actual service.
66. Id. at 131.
67. Id. at 129, 131.
68. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
69. Id. at 552.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 389 U.S. 24 (1967).
73. Id. at 25.
74. Id.
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percentage of Negroes on the tax digest and those on the venires"... ,
was not met by the Georgia Supreme Court's reliance on the stated
presumptions. 7
5
Sims v. Georgia 71 involved essentially the same prima facie case as
did Whitus. Negroes constituted 24.4 percent of those statutorily eli-
gible for jury service in the county, but only 9.8 percent of the jury
list from which the grand and petit juries were selected. 77 The state
introduced testimony offered by a jury commissioner that the commis-
sioners personally knew every qualified person in the county and that
there was no discrimination in the county nor in the selection of
names. 78  The Court, however, held the testimony insufficient to over-
come the prima facie case.79
The judicially forged prima facie case thus enables members of the
excluded group to successfully vitiate jury selection processes. By
establishing an inference of systematic exclusion or by shifting the
burden to the state by a showing of an egregious disparity between
the eligible members of the group in the community and their numeri-
cal representation on the jury, petitioners are placed on firm constitu-
tional ground. State explanations grounded either in assertions of good
faith or in the proferred testimony of jury commissioners averring to have
acted without regard to race or color do not satisfy equal protection
requirements. Such self-serving testimony would make the concept of
unbiased jury selection a vain and illusory requirement."
75. Id., quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967).
76. 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
77. Id. at 407.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 407-08. The Court stated that the facts in Sims were virtually indis-
tinguishable from Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967), and that from considering
the jury commissioner's testimony it was clear that the method of selection did not
meet constitutional requirements.
80. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99 (1935). In Speller v. Alien, 344 U.S.
477 (1953), however, such testimony was central to the Court's finding of no uncon-
stitutional action. There, the eligible juror population was found to be 38 percent
Negro, while 7 percent of the venires were Negro. The statistics in Speller might have
supported a contention of systematic exclusion as opposed to chance exclusion based on
race and color. However, economic criteria, not then judicially considered as pro-
hibited by the Constitution, were introduced by the state to rebut any presumption of
racial discrimination that might have risen. The clerk of the jury commissioners testi-
fied that he chose potential jurors from the usual tax lists then in effect. His method
of choosing, however, was to select those on the list with the most property. He further
testified that no racial discrimination entered into his selection. The Court noted that
the choosing of those with the most property, an economic basis not under scrutiny in the
case, might well have accounted for the few Negroes in the jury box. Id. at 480-81.
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C. The Extension of Fourteenth Amendment Protection to
Other Identifiable Groups
The Fourteenth Amendment has not been limited to the protection
of Negroes."' Although early cases rejected the application of the
Equal Protection Clause to Mexican Americans on the theory that
nationality and race did not bear the same relation under the Four-
teenth Amendment,82 the Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Texas88
eliminated this racial criteria.8 4 In Hernandez, persons of Mexican
American descent contended that they were systematically excluded
from jury service. 85 Although there was no statute expressly pro-
hibiting Mexican Americans from jury service the parties had stipu-
lated that "for the last twenty-five years there is no record of any person
with a Mexican or Latin American name having served on a jury com-
81. The Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), noted that the
purpose underlying the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments was to secure to a recently emancipated race all the civil rights which the
"superior" race enjoys. Id. at 306. Subsequently, however, this protection has been
afforded to classifications other than race.
Discrimination solely because of religion was the issue in a Texas case, Juarez v.
State, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925), where it was contended that since no Catholic jury
commissioner had been appointed, only one Catholic had served on the grand jury
in the years in question. It was further contended that the failure to include Catholics
was the result of a design on the part of officers to deny representation to Catholics.
The trial court refused to hear proof and the appellate court reversed on the grounds
that religious exclusion is a denial of equal protection. Id. at 1094-95.
Nationality was the issue in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese);
United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392 (D.V.I. 1953) (Puerto Ricans
in the Virgin Islands); International Longshoremen v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65
(D. Hawaii 1948) (Filipinos).
82. As early as 1936, the issue was brought before a Texas Court. In Carrasco v.
State, 130 Tex. Crim. 526, 95 S.W.2d 433 (1936), the plaintiff attempted to establish
a systematic exclusion of Mexican Americans from jury service. In denying relief, the
court opined: "In order to sustain the allegation of discrimination, the proof must show
that Mexicans were excluded or discriminated against solely because of race." Id. at
527, 95 S.W.2d 434. In a later Texas case, Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex. 436, 181 S.W.2d
87 (1944), the defendant, a Mexican, insisted that the long, continued, and uninterrupted
failure to call members of the Mexican and Spanish nationalities for jury service consti-
tuted a denial to him of equal protection. In denying the contention, the Texas court ob-
served that such an assertion of a denial of equal protection was applicable only to the
Negro race:
In the absence of a holding by the Supreme Court of the United States that
nationality and race bear the same relation, within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision mentioned, we shall continue to hold that the statute law of this
State furnishes the guide for the selection of juries in this State, and that, in the
absence of proof showing express discrimination by administrators of the law, a
jury so selected in accordance therewith is valid. Id. at 439-40, 181 S.W.2d 90-91.
83. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
84. Id. at 482.
85. Id. at 476.
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mission, grand jury or petit jury in Jackson County."86
The Court recognized that the Texas system of selecting grand and
petit jurors was fair on its face and capable of administration without
discrimination. 87 However, since it was administered to the exclusion
of otherwise eligible groups, solely because of their ancestry or national
origin, the system was constitutionally defective as applied. 88 The
Court noted that identifiable groups other than the Negro could claim
protection under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment:
[F]rom time to time other differences from the community norm may de-
fine other groups which need the same [constitutional] protection ...
When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further
shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for
different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the
guarantees of the Constitution have been violated. 9
Thus, the Hernandez Court presented what appears to be a two-
pronged test of equal protection exclusion applicable to Mexican
Americans and other identifiable groups in the community: (1) the ex-
istence of a distinct class in the county/community must be proved as
a matter of fact, and (2) the laws as written or applied must unrea-
sonably single out that class for different treatment. A statistical or
testimonial evidentiary showing which satisfies the Hernandez test com-
bined with a showing of proportionate disparity would shift the bur-
den of proof to the grand jury selectors. The selectors would then
be required to establish that unequal application of the law was not
the reason for such exclusion.90 The presumption of systematic exclu-
sion raised could not be rebutted by a showing that the exclusion
was "unintentional" in the sense of an unconscious discrimination. "The
result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious de-
cision on the part of any individual jury commissioner."':,
Obviously, the great diversity of nationalities and ethnic groups in our
86. Id. at 481.
87. The Court stated: "As the petitioner acknowledges, the Texas system of se-
lecting grand and petit jurors by the use of jury commissions is fair on its face and
capable of being utilized without discrimination." Id. at 478-79.
88. Id. at 479.
89. Id. at 478.
90. Id. at 481.
91. Id. at 482. A later Colorado case, Montoya v. People, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d
1062 (1959), relied directly upon Hernandez. In Montoya, the petitioners made out
a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of people with Spanish surnames following
the test laid out in Hernandez. The People offered testimony of public officials who
denied both the practice of systematic exclusion and any knowledge of a policy designed
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society renders the task of proportional representation of each on the
grand jury impossible.9" However, once the two-pronged test of
Hernandez is satisfied, a subsequent constitutional challenge should be on
the same ground as the challenges previously discussed by this Comment.
1. The Requirement of "Identifiability"
The ethnological and statistical identifiability of the Spanish surnamed
Mexican American has been noted not only in Hernandez v. Texas,",
but also in Montoya v. People,94 Montez v. Superior Court,"" and
United States v. Hunt.96 These cases merely mirror a fact of life
in this country in general and in the Southwestern United States in
particular. The cultural and ethnic differences of the Mexican Ameri-
can coupled with their large numbers have necessitated studies of var-
ious aspects of the Mexican American for socio-economic and polit-
ical reasons. Numerous publications streaming from various govern-
mental agencies indicate a growing awareness of the identifiability of
this group.97
It is clear that on a governmental and academic plane the Mexican
to promote such exclusion, but the court, reversing Montoya's conviction, held that such
testimony was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case. The element of intent, while
an important factor in determining whether there was systematic exclusion in earlier
cases, was expressly abandoned. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584
(1958); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
92. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950).
93. 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954).
94. 141 Colo. 10, 11, 345 P.2d 1062, 1063 (1959).
95. 10 Cal. App. 3d 343, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1970). Montez was one of the recent
challenges of the grand jury composition in Los Angeles County. There, the defend-
ants' attempt to introduce testimony of unconstitutional under-representation was
denied by the trial court. The court of appeals, in granting a writ of prohibition or, in
the discretion of the trial court, an alternative writ to hear the motion to quash the
indictment de novo, stated that defendants had the right to present evidence showing that
a particular class, to wit, Mexican Americans, does in fact exist and is under-repre-
sented on the grand jury. Id. at 350-51, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41.
96. 265 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Tex. 1967). In Hunt a motion to quash the jury panel
on the ground that it failed to fairly represent Mexican Americans in the community
was denied. However, the court in its opinion took full notice of defendant's massive
evidence on the identifiability of Mexican Americans. Id. at 179-81.
97. Federal government publications include: U.S. CoMM'N ON CrvIL RIGHTS, MEmX-
CAN AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY REPORT No. 1: ETHNIC ISOLATION OF MEXICAN
AMERIcANs IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE SOUTHWEST (1971); U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, STRANGER IN ONE'S LAND (1970); CABINET COMM. ON OPPORTUNITY
FOR THE SPANISH SPEAKING, DRECToRY OF SPANISH SPEAKING COMMUNITY ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, WE THE MEXICAN
AMERICANS (1970); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE
ADMNISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST (1970); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
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American has had significant import and recognition as a viable and
identifiable people. Moreover, the numerical growth and statistical
significance of the group must also be recognized. In Los Angeles,
Mexican Americans comprise the largest ethnic minority situated in the
county. In 1950, the total population in California was 10,586,223.98
The Spanish surnamed population was 758,400, or 7.2 percent of
the total population. 9 The population of Los Angeles County was
4,151,687100 while the Spanish surnamed population numbered 287,614
or 6.93 percent. By 1960 the State population had grown to 15,717,-
204, with the Spanish surnamed population at 1,426,538 or 9.1 per-
cent of the total.101 At the same time, the Los Angeles County pop-
ulation had become 6,039,83402 while the Spanish surnamed pop-
ulation climbed to 576,716 or 9.5 percent.10 3 In summary, during
the 1950-60 decade, the state's population grew 48.5 percent while the
Spanish surname number grew by 88.1 percent. In Los Angeles
County, total population increased 45.5 percent while Spanish sur-
named inhabitants grew by 100.5 percent.
The trend of the earlier decade has continued from 1960 until the
present. A Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission es-
timated the population in 1965 to be 6,583,027 for the County.'0 4
An expert demographer estimated that the County population in 1967
was 7,032,400, with 874,000 persons of Spanish surname or 12.4 per-
RIGHTS, THE MEXICAN AMERICAN (1968); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DATA FOR WHITE
PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME IN FIVE SOUTHWESTERN STATES (1960) (The states are
Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico and Texas).
State government publications concerning Mexican Americans include: CALIFORNIA
STATE ADVISORY COMM., POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF MEXICAN AMERICANS IN
CALIFORNIA (1971); CALIFORNIA STATE ADVISORY COMM., POLICE-COMMUNITY RELA-
TIONS IN EAST Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA (1970); CALIFORNIA STATE ADVISORY COMM.,
EDUCATION AND THE MEXICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY
(1968); CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALIFORNIANS OF SPANISH SUR-
NAME (1964).
98. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES To 1957, at 12 (1960).
99. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALIFORNIANS OF SPANISH SUR-
NAME 20 (1964).
100. LOs ANGELES COUNTY ALMANAC 65 (1969).
101. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULA-
TION: 1960 SUBJECT REPORTS, PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME 4 (1963).
102. LOS ANGELES CoUNTY ALMANAC 65 (1969).
103. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALIFORNIANS OF SPANISH SUR-
NAME 26, 28 (1964).
104. LOs ANGELES COUNTY ALMANAC 65 (1969).
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cent of the total.105 The 1970 Census reported a population of 6,-
993,371 for Los Angeles County 06 while a study published by the
Economics and Youth Opportunities Agency of greater Los Angeles
(EYOA) in 1971, found that according to the April, 1970 U.S. Census
figures, there were approximately 1,000,000 Spanish surnamed people
in the County, or 14.2 percent.10 7 An official census report of the Mex-
ican American Population Commission of California estimated the
Mexican American population in Los Angeles County in 1970 at
18.2 percent with an accurate projection of 21.1 percent by 1975 and
23.9 percent of the total population in the County by 1980.108
A recapitulation of the figures reveals:
Year Total Population Spanish Surnamed Percentage
1950 4,151,687 287,614 6.9%
1960 6,039,834 576,716 9.5%
1967 7,032,400 874,000 12.4%
1970 6,993,371 1,000,000 14.2%
2. The Requirement of "Subject to Prejudice"
The second prong of the Hernandez test requires a showing that the
contested laws as written or applied subject a class to prejudice or dif-
ferent treatment. 109 In California, the Mexican American has clearly
been subjected to cultural bias since 1848.
An insight into this historical prejudice'" may best be initiated by
reference to events shortly following the signing of the Treaty of Guada-
lupe ilidalgo. 1" This treaty purported to guarantee full citizenship
rights to Mexicans who remained in the conquered Southwest follow-
ing the United States' victory in the brief Mexican War. However,
one of the initial actions of the neophyte California Legislature was
105. People v. Castro, Crim. No. A232902 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County,
Jan. 9, 1969), Defense Exhibit N.
106. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 13 (1970).
107. E.Y.O.A., REsEARCH AND EVALUATION DIvIsioN, 1971 REPORT. Sources are
based on (1) E.Y.O.A. working papers, (2) Bureau of Census Reports, (3) L.A.
County Regional Planning Commission studies and (4) Southern California Re-
gional Information Study, 1970 Census Data.
108. mEXICAN AMERICAN POPULATION COMM'N OF CALIFORNIA, MEXIcAN AMERICAN
POPULATION IN CALIFORNIA 10 (1971).
109. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954).
110. See E. GALAzA, MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE Sourmwnsr 57-73 (1969); R.
LANDES, LATIN AMERCANS OF THE SOUTHWEST 1-18, 47-100 (1965); C. McWLIAMS,
NORTH FROM MExICO 206-304 (1948).
111. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922-43 (1848), T.S.
No. 207.
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the adoption of a foreign miners' license tax designed specifically to
eliminate the competition of Mexican miners.' 12 Subsequently, nu-
merous Mexican miners were physically attacked, lynched and murdered
in California's Gold Rush territory, causing most of the survivors to
abandon their claims and flee to the south. 113  Historian Carey Mc-
Williams noted that "the ease and swiftness of the victory over
Mexico and the conquest of California had bred in the Americans
a measureless contempt for all things Mexican."
'" 4
A recent study and report by the California State Advisory Com-
mittee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights" 5 revealed
that many of the methods used in the past to exclude Mexican Ameri-
cans from political participation in California were strikingly similar
to those used to exclude Negroes in the South: tests based on educa-
tion and literacy, gerrymandering, intimidation, and murder." 6 How-
ever, English language voting requirements and threats of deportation
provided two additional tools to aid in the exclusion of Mexican Amer-
icans."17  The State Advisory Committee Study further revealed that
while Mexican Americans represent 12 to 15 percent" 8 of the pop-
ulation in California, they presently hold less than 2 percent of the
112. An Act for the Better Regulation of the Mines and the Government of For-
eign Miners, ch. 97, [1850] Cal. Stat. 221-22 (repealed Ch. 108, § 1 [1851] Cal. Stat.
424).
113. CALIFORNIA STATE ADviSORY COMM. TO THE UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, POLITCAL PARTICIPATION OF MEXICAN AMERCANS mI CALIFORNIA 4 (1971).
114. C. McWLLIAMS, NORTH FROM MEXICO 129 (1968). Mr. McWilliams vividly
describes the historical segregation of the Mexican American:
Above all it is important to remember that Mexicans are a "conquered" people
in the Southwest, a people whose culture has been under incessant attack for
many years and whose character and achievements, as a people, have been con-
sistently disparaged. Apart from the physical violence, conquered and con-
queror have continued to be competitors for land and jobs and power, parties to
a constant economic conflict which has found expression in litigation, disposses-
sions, hotly contested elections, and the mutual disparagement which inevitably ac-
companies a situation of this kind. Throughout this struggle, the Anglo-Americans
have possessed every advantage: in numbers and wealth, arms and machines.
Having been subjected, first to a brutal physical attack, and then to a long process
of economic attrition, it is not surprising that so many Mexicans should show
evidences of the spiritual defeatism which so often arises when a cultural minority is
annexed to an alien culture and way of life. More is involved, in situations of
this kind, than the defeat of individual ambitions, for the victims also suffer from
the defeat of their culture and of the society of which they are a part. Id. at 132.
115. CALIFORNIrA STATE ADVISORY COMm. TO THE UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF MEXICAN AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA (1971).
116. Id. at 5-6.
117. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I1, § 1: "[N]o person who shall not be able to read
the Constitution in the English language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise
the privileges of an elector in this State .. "
118. CALIFORNIA STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF MEXICAN AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA 8 (1971).
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State's elective offices in the United States Congress and State Legis-
lature.1
19
It is apparent that the Mexican American has been, and is, the sub-
ject of prejudice in California. A study conducted by the respected
Institute of Governmental Studies cogently summarizes society's prej-
udicial view of the Mexican American and concludes:
The Mexican American minority is frequently treated as if it were
a "racial" as well as a nationality, religious, and linguistic minority.
Sociologically, Mexican-Americans can be thought of as a distinct group
whose physical characteristics, coupled with their cultural traits, lead
to their being discriminated against in a variety of ways by the domi-
nant "white" elements in the culture, and to their occupying a general
position closely akin to that of the Negro. It is the Mexican's cultural
disparity more than his color that sets him apart, and cultural disparity
is more readily shucked than is pigmentation. 120
IV. EXCLUSION AND UNDER-REPRESENTATION OF SPANISH SURNAMED
MEXICAN AMERICANS FROM CONSIDERATION, NOMINATION AND
SELECTION FOR THE Los ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURIES
Since 1962, judges of the Los Angeles County Superior Court
have been expressly advised by the presiding judge that the grand jury
should be representative of a cross section of the community.' 21 Each
judge therefore is on notice to be mindful of the need to make nom-
inations from the various racial and ethnic groups, economic sectors
and geographic areas.' 22 Of the 234 judges who have made one or
more nominations from 1959 to 1972, only 31 judges or 13.2 percent
have ever nominated Spanish surnamed Mexican American persons for
119. Id. See 117 CONG. REc. No. 172A (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1971).
120. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFoRNIA AT BERELEY, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIS,
MINORITY GRouPs AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN TnE SAN FRANCisco BAY AREA 8
(1963).
121. Letters from several presiding judges have been written. The latest is the
letter from Judge Lloyd Nix to all judges of the Superior Court (Los Angeles County),
July 26, 1967, on file at the offices of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
122. Note should be taken that until 1963, selection of Los Angeles County grand
jury nominees was controlled by CAL. PEN. CODE § 899 (West 1954):
The names for the grand jury list shall be selected from the different wards,
judicial districts, or supervisorial districts of the respective counties in proportion
to the number of inhabitants therein, as nearly as the same can be estimated by
the persons making the lists.
Ch. 1614, § 1 [1963] Cal. Stat. 3207, amended CAL. PEN. CODE § 899 by adding: "In
a county of the first class, the names for such list may be selected from the county at
large.,,
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grand jury service. 123  A statistical summary12 1 of the percentage of
bona fide Spanish surnamed nominees among the 1959-1969 grand
jury nomination pool was offered in People v. Montez' 25 and is here
brought up to date:'
12
Year A B C D Ratio
1959 132 1 1 0.8% 132:1
1960 146 2 2 1.4% 73:1
1961 148 3 3 2.0% 49:1
1962 144 4 4 2.8% 36:1
1963 140 5 5 3.6% 28:1
1964 155 7 6 4.5% 22:1
1965 152 6 6 3.9% 25:1
1966 162 5 5 3.1% 32:1
1967 151 4 4 2.6% 38:1
1968 171 3 3 1.8% 57:1
1969 189 7 7 3.7% 27:1
1970 155 10 10 6.4% 16:1
1971 164 13 13 7.9% 13:1
1972 214 15 15 7.0% 14:1
Totals 2223 85 84 3.7% (an average)
Key: A=Total Nominations12
7
B=Total SS (Spanish surnamed) Nominations12
8
C=Number of Individual SS Nominees (many of whom were repeat nominees)1
2 9
D=Percentage of SS Nominations to Total Nominations
The above statistics reflect with greater clarity the widespread failure to
nominate Spanish surnamed Mexican Americans when it is realized that
one judge nominated 12 of the total Spanish surnamed Mexican Ameri-
can individuals. 130 Actually, only 41 individual Spanish surnamed
Mexican Americans have been nominated during the fourteen-year pe-
riod since some individuals were being nominated year after year' s' and,
as the following compilation indicates, only six nominees from the total
number shown above (excluding 1972) were ultimately selected to
serve on the grand jury.'82
123. See note 8 supra.
124. id.
125. Crim. No. A244906 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Oct. 27, 1969).
126. See note 8 supra.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Individual Spanish surnamed nominees stated are the total individuals nomi-
nated each year. Some judges nominate the same person thus providing a "double
nominee."
130. See note 8 supra.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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No. of Ultimately No. of Spanish
Year Selected Grand Surnamed Grand
Jurors Jurors
1959 19 0
1960 19 0
1961 19 0
1962 19 0
1963 19 0
1964 23 0
1965 22 2
1966 23 0
1967 24 1
1968 23 1
1969 23 0
1970 23 1
1971 23 1
279 6
The net effect of the nomination-selection process during the past
thirteen years has been the total exclusion from eight of the last
thirteen grand juries of the Spanish surnamed Mexican Americans,
a class which constituted from 9.55 percent to approximately 14 per-
cent of the County population from 1959 to 1971. Only 2.1 percent
of the grand jurors ultimately selected over the past thirteen years
have been of the Mexican American ethnic minority. Whether one
counts nominees (a fourteen-year average of approximately one Mex-
ican American to 26.10 nominees) or grand jurors (a thirteen-year
average of approximately one Mexican American to 46.5 grand jurors),
there has been a striking and long-standing disparity between popula-
tion and grand jury representation. Simple proportional representa-
tion based on the conservative estimate of Mexican American popula-
tion would have established approximately 222 Spanish surnamed Mex-
ican American nominees and approximately 26 grand jurors of that
ethnic extraction.
The total number of nominations has progressively increased from
a low of 132 nominees in 1959 to a high of 214 in 1972, while the
total number of Spanish surnamed Mexican Americans increased in
the County from 9 percent to 14 percent. In contrast, the ratio of
Mexican American nominees to total nominees was at its lowest in
1959 (0.8%) andin 1968 (1.2%). The disparity (12.9% of the total
population to 3.7% of nominees) in the composition of 1969 grand
jury nominees was approximately 4 to 1. Only once, 1971, has the
disparity been less than 2 to 1. A study of the California grand jury
system 3' found that a disparity of 2:1 or 2.5:1 has great significance
133. 1970 STUDY, supra note 32, at 112-35.
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when continued over five or more years and that such a disparity is
mathematically impossible if grand jury selection is fair.134 The
study continues:
The principles espoused by both judges and mathematicians would
indicate that a long continued disparity of 3:1 or more between the per-
centage of minority grand jurors and the minority group percentage of
the community raises a presumption of unconstitutional selection.
A 3:1 disparity is "very decided."'
3 5
Unfortunately, precise statistical standards have not been articulated
that would define exactly what disparity would raise a presumption of
racial discrimination in the selection of juries. 136  The length of the
period during which the disparity must exist is yet another factor that
is open to question.'37  In recent cases, periods of twenty-four years,
138
sixteen years,xS3 six years,'40 five years,"' and even one year142 have
been considered sufficient. In order to cope with the ambiguous dis-
parities involved, legislation has been proposed under which a defi-
nite disparity coupled with a fixed time period would trigger federal
intervention in the selection of state juries. 4 3  However, these pro-
posals have never been adopted and it appears that judicial determina-
tions applied on an ad hoe basis' 44 provide the only guidelines of the
134. Id. at 115.
135. Id. The mathematical analysis was based on Finkelstein, The Application of
Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338
(1966).
136. See text accompanying notes 55-80 supra for a discussion of the prima facie
presumption.
137. Id.
138. Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
139. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942).
140. Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 727 (5th Cir. 1966).
141. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). It should be noted that the Cassell
Court placed its major emphasis on the systematic technique of exclusion rather than
on the period of time in question.
142. Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967);
Witus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
143. Legislative proposals have been submitted which would provide that one-third-
under-representation for a two-year period be made the test of discrimination for the
purpose of triggering federal selection of state jurors and permitting removal of cases to
the federal courts. See, e.g., S.2923 and H.R. 12845, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. (1966).
144. But see Note, The Congress, The Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of
Titles I and i of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1151 (1966)
wherein the author espouses a due process limitation upon the problems of jury selec-
tion:
It should be held that due process of law requires that standards . . . be not
unduly restrictive and both objectively applicable and objectively applied [in favor
of] a case-by-case adjudication of the propriety of the administration of the stat-
utes in the distorted context of litigation.
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showing required to establish the presumption of unconstitutional exclu-
sion. A prima facie case of jury discrimination has been presented
where 24.4 percent of the taxpayers145 from whom jury lists are drawn
were Negro, but only 9.8 percent were veniremen146 (veniremen may
be equated to the list of nominees to the grand jury);14 7 where 27.1
percent of the taxpayers were Negro out of a population of Negroes
in the county of 42.6 percent, but only 9.1 percent of that group were
veniremen; 48 where the over-21 population in a county was 30.7 per-
cent Negro and the taxpayers were 19.7 percent Negro, but only 5 per-
cent of the veniremen were Negro; 49 where 38 percent of the tax-
payers were Negro, but only 7 percent were veniremen; 1 0 and where
32 percent of the population were Negroes, but only 3.7 percent of the
veniremen were of the same race.1 5' In Los Angeles County it has
been found that the Mexican American population has ranged from
approximately 9 percent to a present 14.2 percent of the total popula-
tion, yet only 3.7 percent of the grand jury nominees for the past 14
years have been Mexican American.'
52
It must be pointed out that to raise the issue does not prove the
fact. 5 3  The statistical evidence and showing made only establishes
145. The fact that taxpayer lists were employed in several of the cases as a statistical
basis for analysis should not affect the adoption of these holdings to the presentation
of this Comment. See note 152 infra.
146. Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
147. Venireman is defined as "a member of a panel of jurors; a juror summoned by
a writ of venire facias." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1727 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
148. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
149. Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967).
150. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
151. Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 716 (5th Cir. 1966).
152. For purposes of this Comment, and in the absence of any studies or statistics to
the contrary, the assumption will be made that the ratio of eligible Mexican American
grand jurors to that of eligible Anglo-American grand jurors remains constant to the
ratio of the population in Los Angeles County. The assumption is based on (1) ab-
sence of any source lists needed for nomination, such as voting, telephone, etc.; (2) the
absence of overly restrictive qualifications for service such as used in many cases
cited above, such as poll taxes, property criteria or voter registration.
153. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), where the Court stated that
the apparent disparity between the number of Negroes in the county and the number
of Negro veniremen was caused by the practice of choosing those for the jury with the
most property, an economic basis not under scrutiny at trial. Petitioners' charge of
discrimination against Negroes in the selection of grand and petit jurors was denied.
The Court was of the opinion that the disparity present was reasonable and consti-
tutional in view of the fact that jurors were drawn from tax lists. "We recognize the
fact that these lists have a higher proportion of white citizens than of colored, doubt-
less due to inequality of educational and economic opportunities." Id. at 473. In
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 404 (1945), the petitioner asserted that the jury com-
1972] COMMENTS
the prima facie case. It then becomes incumbent upon the defenders
of a particular selection system to adduce evidence that overcomes the
showing of unconstitutional exclusion. 54
The foregoing cases and statistics, when coupled with both the recent
statistical studies of racial identity and the percentage disparity shown
between Mexican Americans in Los Angeles County and the number
nominated and selected for grand jury service, patently evidence a
prima facie showing of racial under-representation and unconstitutional
discrimination against the Mexican American as a class. In addition,
the Supreme Court has indicated that a jury selection system may be
constitutionally infirm notwithstanding the absence of a prima facie
case.1r 5 In several cases the Court has not limited inquiry to result,
but has examined the intentions, methods and actions of the jury
commissioners in selecting persons for jury service to discover whether
there has been discrimination.' 5
A. The Selection Process
Recently in People v. Castro,5" People v. Montez' 5s and People v.
Ramirez,'59 the petitioners contended and endeavored to prove that
missioners deliberately, intentionally and purposely limited the number of Negroes
that should be selected for a grand jury panel. The Court found that said jury com-
missioners did not intentionally discriminate and that the Texas courts endeavored to
comply with Federal Constitutional requirements concerning the selection of grand
juries as set forth in Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
In United States v. Hunt, 265 F. Supp. 178, 194 (W.D. Tex. 1967) the court held
that in a county where 36 percent of the total population of a county was Mexican
American and 17.5 percent of the eligible jurors in the county were Mexican Ameri-
can, discrimination did not exist where 11 percent of the jurors were of that class.
154. See notes 61 & 62 supra.
155. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
156. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 207-09 (1965), while there was no prima
facie case, the Court affirmed only after examining at length the intentions and methods
of the commissioners in selecting jurors.
In Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-90 (1950), the jury panels closely reflected a
fair racial cross section. Nevertheless, the Court reversed petitioner's conviction because
the selectors had failed in their affirmative duty to familiarize themselves with qualified
Negroes-their practice being to include only one Negro per panel.
In Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-07 (1945), there was no prima facie case, for
the jury panel itself closely approached a cross section of the community. Yet the
Court went on to examine the actions and intentions of the jury commissioners and
affirmed only on the ground that purposeful limitation of Negroes had not been factually
demonstrated.
157. Crim. No. A232902 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Jan. 9, 1969).
158. Crim. No. A244906 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Oct. 27, 1969).
159. Crim. No. A244906 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, March 31, 1971).
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the system of consideration, nomination and selection of grand jurors
by Los Angeles County Superior Court judges systematically deprived
eligible Spanish surnamed Mexican Americans of the opportunity to
serve on the grand jury.1 60 The petitioners asserted that the statistical
disparity between the number of Mexican Americans in the county and
the number nominated was caused by the very system of selection used.
They sought to establish that, with very few exceptions, the judges of the
Superior Court, by reason of birth, education, residence, wealth, social
and professional associations, and similar factors were not acquainted
with, and had not attempted to acquaint themselves with, the qualifi-
cations of eligible potential grand jurors of the Mexican American
class.
16'
Sworn testimony elicited from 109 judges of the Superior Court
focused on their attitudes and the methods they employed when con-
sidering, nominating and selecting persons for the grand jury.
6 2
The following table illustrates the virtual lack of effort taken by these
judges to honor the presiding judge's admonition to select from all
classes of the community, including Mexican Americans, when nominat-
ing persons for grand jury service. 6 '
Information elicited: 1959-1971104
Never considered or requested ethnic minorities 15 -................25
Almost always considered ethnic minorities' 6 6  8
160. Montez v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 343, 350 (1970).
161. Id. at 350. In the Montez case, the California District Court of Appeals
pointed out that even if statistical evidence is unable to shift the burden to the state,
the attackers may call as their own witnesses those empowered to administer the
selection procedure. The court found no case that had ever precluded this type of
testimony. In Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1970),
the court granted in part and denied in part a writ of prohibition without deciding a
petitioner's challenge to the composition of the grand jury.
162. See Ramirez Record, supra note 2.
163. See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
164. The table constitutes the summation of the testimony of the judge-selectors in
response to the questions posed by the defense counsel in People v. Ramirez, Crim. No.
A244906 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, March 31, 1971), regarding the methods em-
ployed from 1959-70.
165. This was the response to questions posed by counsel to every judge. The
questions were substantially phrased: "Between the years (of appointment to the
bench) to 1969 have you ever considered nominating any person to the grand jury
whom you believed to be a Mexican American?" If the response was "no," similar
questions were asked of Black Americans, American Indians and Oriental Americans.
Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 320, 1158, 1196-97, 1538, 1546, 1593, 1637, 1653,
1679, 1684-86, 1696, 2021-22, 2194-95, 2217, 2249, 2321, 2424, 2525-26, 2570-72,
2579, and 2611.
166. In response to being asked if he had any knowledge that Caucasian judges on the
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Never considered or requested Mexican American' 67  26
Token affirmative steps to nominate
Mexican American-168 27
Concrete affirmative steps to nominate
Mexican American 69  12
Nominated Mexican American 170  15
Testimony was also sought which would support the contention that
the demonstrated racially under-representative composition of the grand
bench had picked Caucasian nominees intentionally or systematically one judge an-
swered:
Yes. Systematically, because they, as a rule, won't have contact with anyone
else, so it has to be intentionally and systematic, the same as if I can get a Negro
I'm going to select him for the grand jury because I know it's the only way--or
I wouldn't say the only way, but it's the most probable way that any number of
Negroes will get on the grand juries is by the Negro judges selecting Negro nomi-
nees. Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 1502-03.
Another judge was asked (speaking of his nominees from 1960 to 1969): "Were
each of these persons Mexican Americans?" The judge answered: "with the excep-
tion of one." Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 2379. See Ramirez Record, supra
note 2, at 834, 1406, 1625, 2042, 2411, and 2548.
167. Counsel's inquiry was phrased substantially as follows: "Were any of the per-
sons that you considered for the grand jury (stating the years) persons that you
believed to be Mexican Americans?" Twenty-six judges responded in the negative. Ra-
mirez Record, supra note 2, at 1158, 1191, 1412, 1430, 1470, 1484, 1512, 1526, 1537,
1544, 1593, 1612, 1637, 1653, 1665, 1679, 1696, 1967, 1975, 1984, 2021, 2217, 2247,
2312, and 2321.
168. In response to the question, "Were any of the persons that you considered,
persons that you believed to be Mexican-American?", one judge replied:
I've always considered that. If I can interject a voluntary statement here, my
problem has always been this; that although I knew many Mexican-American
people, unfortunately none of them seemed to be in a position where they could
serve as grand jurors, if nominated. I think that, unfortunately, a person, to serve
as a member of the grand jury, almost is compelled to be either retired with an
independent income, or at least an independent income. It comes right down to
that financial situation. I think they either have to be a housewife without any
outside duties, without any children dependent upon her, or a retired person who
no longer needs to work, or a person with an independent income. And most of
the Mexican Americans I knew didn't fall in any of those categories. Ramirez
Record, supra note 2, at 1564-65.
Another response to the same question provoked the question from the second judge:
"You mean specifically an individual or as a class?" When answered--"an in-
dividual," the judge responded: "No. I have never had any specific individual [in mind],
but as a class yes, if I had been able to find one." Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at
2149-50. See Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 187, 237, 1573, 1623, 1683, 1710, 1739-
41, 1800, 1813, 1849, 1911-12, 1951, 2035, 2112-13, 2132-33, 2210, 2271, 2299, 2357-58,
2415, 2428, 2475, 2481, 2485, 2490-91, 2501, 2540-41, and 2560.
169. In response to counsel's inquiry if the judge had ever taken steps to consider
the nomination of a person he believed to be Mexican American, some replied that
they had considered specific individuals but that those individuals who were asked
could not serve if nominated. Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 560, 1254-57, 1325,
1446-47, 1782, 1881, 1900-02, 1958, 2084-87, 2340, and 2436.
170. Those who nominated a Mexican American are noted in the Ramirez Record,
supra note 2, at 209, 666, 770-71, 927-30, 1341, 1364, 1406, 1581, 1919-22, 2103-04,
2170-71, 2179, 2257, 2379, 2559-60 and 2596.
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juries in question was due not only to a failure to consider Mexican
Americans, but also to a failure to affirmatively seek out eligible Mex-
ican Americans. 171  The judges obliged by explaining their reasons for
not nominating any Mexican Americans. This testimony may be gen-
erally classified as follows:
Mexican American has no ethnic identity"' 2  10
Not acquainted with Mexican American
who was qualified"' 3  47
Mexican Americans could not
afford to serve' 7 4  23
Not acquainted with Mexican American who
sought nomination1 '_ 5  3
Rely on minority judges to nominate
minority members"76  8
171. See text accompanying notes 179-99 infra for discussion of the substantive
aspects of the affirmative duty.
172. Defense counsel inquired of one judge: "In your opinion, is there any distinc-
tion between the class known as Mexican Americans and any other ethnic class of per-
sons here in Los Angeles County?" The judge answered "No sir." Ramirez Record,
supra note 2, at 1535. Another judge was asked, "Is there any difference in your mind
between Mexican Americans and other Americans?" This judge replied, "Some are a
little more courteous than Anglo Americans .... " Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at
788. See Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 444, 467, 535-38, 651, 1426, and 1477.
173. Counsel asked one judge: "To your knowledge, of those persons with whom you
talked to concerning the possible nomination, were any of them Mexican-American?"
The judge replied:
I'm sure they weren't. . . because I know none in the classification of persons
that might be eligible, might give their time, that is, and could stand the financial
distress of being a member of the grand jury.
Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 1544. Expressing his own view a judge testified:
"If I ever knew anyone [Mexican Americans], I would be delighted to [recommend]
them. . . . I don't know any Mexican-Americans who are a prospect for the grand
jury...." Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 401. See Ramirez Record, supra note 2,
at 512, 519-20, 1419, 1432, 1435, 1473, 1484, 1512, 1514, 1526-27, 1537-38, 1555-56,
1614, 1638-39, 1653, 1655, 1669, 1703, 1753, 1763, 1799, 1860, 1872, 1904, 1911-12,
1953, 1968, 1976, 1985, 2038, 2051, 2065, 2135, 2149-50, 2155, 2212, 2225, 2247,
2322. 2371, 2392-93, 2418, 2424, 2481-85, 2491-92, 2506, 2530, 2570, 2580, and 2611.
174. This was the general response to various questions which inquired that if
the judges had known any Mexican Americans who were eligible to serve and who
could afford to serve, would they have nominated them. These judges answered that if
they could find a Mexican American who could afford to serve, they would not hesitate
to nominate one. Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 237, 1557-58, 1565, 1595, 1641,
1694, 1767, 1816, 1828, 1872, 1951, 1960, 1993, 2035, 2112, 2132, 2210, 2271, 2339,
2992-95, 2436, 2475, 2491, and 2570.
175. The particular judges stated that they had not been approached by Mexican
Americans requesting grand jury nomination. Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 1158,
1196, and 2228-29.
176. These judges relied on minority judges to nominate minority group mem-
bers. If a minority judge was questioned, the majority of them replied that they took
it upon themselves to insure that persons of minority groups were nominated, stating
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Thus, on the basis of these responses it may be safely asserted that the
proportional disparity in nomination is due in large part to a failure to af-
firmatively seek out and nominate eligible grand jurors of Mexican
American extraction residing in Los Angeles County. Further, since the
ethnic identity of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles County is firmly
established, 177 the failure to nominate from this group on the ground that
it has no identity is an absurdity. 7 1 The question remains, how-
ever, whether the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the judges as
jury selectors an affirmative duty to familiarize themselves with all of
the racially, ethnically or otherwise significant groups in the community
eligible for service.
B. The Affirmative Duty to Seek Out
The concept of an affirmative duty of the selector to select from all
of the community was first espoused in Smith v. Texas.179  There,
the petitioner offered to show that while Negroes constituted 20 per-
cent of the county population only three individual Negroes had sat
on the grand juries in the years 1931 to 1938.180 The Court, in
finding racial discrimination, stated:
What the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits is racial discrimination in
the selection of grand juries. Where jury commissioners limit those
from whom grand juries are selected to their own personal acquaintance,
discrimination can arise from commissioners who know no Negroes
as well as Commissioners who know but eliminate them. If there has
been discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously,
the conviction cannot stand.18 '
The Smith Court thus recognized that when those appointed to se-
lect prospective jurors are empowered with the discretion as to whom
to select, exercise of the discretion in such a way as to intentionally
that if they did not nominate minorities, very few minorities would ever be selected.
Ramirez Record, supra note 2, at 671, 1503, 1999, 2379, 2411, and 2548.
177. See text accompanying notes 93-120 supra.
178. In Ganz v. Justice Court, 273 Cal. App. 2d 612, 78 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1969), the
court was of the opinion that Mexican Americans of Spanish surname did not consti-
tute a class with a common racial inheritance in California. Thus the court im-
plied that the equal protection contentions of the petitioner were not to be afforded
the same or similar treatment applied to the Negro exclusion cases. However, this
archaic and unenlightened perspective cannot withstand the statistical recognition of
the Mexican American as a constitutionally protected class within the meaning of
Hernandez.
179. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
180. Id. at 128-29.
181. Id. at 132.
19721
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
or unintentionally exclude or under-represent significant groups in the
community by selecting persons of their own acquaintance, constitutes
an unconstitutional exclusion of the protected group. This concept
was developed further in Hill v. Texas,18 2 wherein two of the three
jury commissioners who selected the grand jury which indicted the
petitioner stated that they did not know of any Negroes legally quali-
fied to serve as grand jurors. The commissioners further testified
that they had made no investigation to ascertain whether there were
Negroes in the county qualified for grand jury service.18 3 The
Court viewed such inaction on the part of the jury commissioners
as patent discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'84
Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, stated:
Discrimination can arise from the action of commissioners who exclude
all Negroes whom they do not know to be qualified and who neither
know nor seek to learn whether there are in fact any qualified to serve.
In such a case, discrimination necessarily results where there are quali-
fied Negroes available for jury service. 185
Thus, passive de facto discrimination through inaction of the jury
selectors is a denial of equal protection notwithstanding a failure to
show an intentional exclusion.' 86
The affirmative duty concept is clearly articulated in Cassell v.
Texas.187 .There, the petitioner attempted to establish a discrimina-
tory class exclusion and presented the testimony of the three jury
commissioners to support his allegations. 8 The Supreme Court, in
182. 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
183. Id. at 402-03.
184. Id. at 404.
185. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
186. It was previously noted that 71 percent of the Los Angeles Superior Court judges
took either no action at all or merely token efforts to consider a Mexican American.
The People asked all 109 judges who testified the following questions:
1. In considering whom to nominate for grand jury service, was it your purpose to
deliberately exclude members of any racial group?
2. By actually placing in nomination those persons whose names you mentioned
here in court as being your nominees, did you ever intend to intentionally, arbitrarily
and systematically exclude from grand jury service members of any racial or ethnic
group?
Nearly all of the judges answered "no" to both questions. See Ramirez Record, supra
note 2.
187. 339 U.S. 282 (1950). Mr. Justice Reed announced the opinion of the Court in
which Vinson, C. J., Black and Clark, JJ. concurred. Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a
separate concurring opinion joined by Burton and Minton, J.J. Mr. Justice Clark filed
a separate concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Jackson dissented. Mr. Justice Douglas
took no part in the judgment.
188. Cassell v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 648, 651, 216 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Crim. App. Ct.
Tex. 1948).
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reexamining the facts to determine whether petitioner had sustained
by proof his allegation of discrimination, 89 noted that the jury com-
missioners' testimony indicated that they purposely included one Negro
on the majority of lists from which the grand jury was selected. 190 This
limitation of one Negro per panel proportionally matched the percentage
of Negroes in the county eligible for grand jury service.' 9 ' While the
Court found no prima facie case,192 petitioner's conviction was re-
versed solely on the testimony of the jury commissioners that they
chose only whom they knew and that they knew no eligible Negroes,
although more than 16.5 percent of the population were Negroes.
93
In so reversing, the Cassell Court stated that it was the duty of those
empowered to select jurors to familiarize themselves with the quali-
fications of the eligible jurors in the County without regard to race
or color.0 4  Thus, the omission of minority members, their gross un-
der-representation on the jury lists, or even an allegation of purposeful
limitation as in Cassell will elicit a presumption of discrimination,'95
which testimony of "failure to familiarize" will not rebut. 96 In accord,
it is apparent that the testimony of the Superior Court Judges in Los
189. Reexamination of the facts by the Court to determine whether a petitioner
was denied a federal right was approved in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 272
(1947); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354,
358 (1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935).
190. 339 U.S. 282, 294-95 (1950), concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
with whom Mr. Justice Minton and Mr. Justice Burton joined.
191. Evidence presented in Cassell indicated that 15.5 percent of the population in
Dallas County was Negro. In the five years since Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942),
there were 21 grand juries-17 members, or 6.7 percent of which were Negro. The
discrepancy is explained by the fact that Texas grand jurors must possess certain statu-
tory qualifications. See Tx. CODE CRiM. PRoc. art. 339 (Vernon 1948). Evidence
further indicated that 6.5 percent of the Negro population met the requirements.
339 U.S. at 284-85.
192. In view of the "non-discriminatory" evidence presented, the Court stated:
"Without more it cannot be said that Negroes had been left off grand-jury panels to
such a degree as to establish a prima facie case of discrimination." 339 U.S. at 285-86.
193. Id. at 290.
194. Id. at 289. This principle was affirmed in Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,
561 (1953), where the Court stated:
The Jury Commissioners, and the other officials responsible for the selection of
this [jury] panel, were under a constitutional duty to follow a procedure---"a
course of conduct"--which would not "operate to discriminate in the selection of
jurors on racial grounds."
But cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (although the state selection pro-
cedure was haphazard and little effort was taken to insure full representation
of all groups of the community, such an imperfect system did not establish intentional
exclusion based on race).
195. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
196. The affirmative duty of the selectors to familiarize themselves with the com-
munity is further evidenced by the federal companion to systematic exclusion-the
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cross section requirement. This mandate was established in Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942):
[ihe proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself,
requires that the jury be a "body truly representative of the community"....
[Selectors] must not allow the desire for competent jurors to lead them into
selections which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section
of the community.
The cross section requirement has been applied to include socio-economic groups as
well as racial and ethnic groups. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)
(women); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (day laborers); Labat
v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (daily
wage earners). A recent federal act codifies the requirement and expressly directs
that the jury be "selected at random from a fair cross section of the community. . ....
Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat. 54,
amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1964) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970)).
While the systematic exclusion rule derives its thrust from the Equal Protection
Clause, the cross section requirement is a due process application which rests upon the
Supreme Court's supervisory power over the federal court system. See Moore v. New
York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). Al-
though the Supreme Court has not applied the rule to the states as of yet, the fifth
circuit has ruled that the exemption of daily wage earners from the jury system is
violative of equal protection and due process. The court maintained that the
cross section directive was extended by the Supreme Court in Thiel and Ballard "beyond
the mere application of supervisory power." Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 722 n.40
(5th Cir. 1966).
The cross section of the community rule has been adopted in California to some
extent. In People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
875 (1955), the California Supreme Court stated:
The American system requires an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of
the entire community and recognition must be given to the fact that eligible jurors
are to be found in every stratum of society. Id. at 754.
The impact of the White decision is yet all too unclear. In People v. Nero, 19 Cal.
App. 3d 904, 97 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1971), the court held that individual grand jurors' right
to privacy outweighed the petitioner's need for requested information that would reveal
the economic strata of jury composition. Id. at 910, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 148. The court
then continued to apparently confuse a prima facie case of systematic exclusion with the
due process issue of failure to select a cross section of the community. Further, the
court focused on the petitioner's group or class. A due process claim can be successfully
asserted, however, by a non-member of the unrepresented class because all defendants
are entitled to a representative jury. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217
(1946). An equal protection challenge, on the other hand, may require the challenger
to be a member of the allegedly excluded group. See Note, The Jury: A Reflection of
the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HAsT. L.J. 1417, 1435-40 (1969), for a discussion
of the cross section rule as compared to equal protection application.
An extension of the due process cross section application to the states may be
forthcoming. Application of the Sixth Amendment to certain state judicial procedures
has already eliminated several of the obstacles to the adoption of this approach. The
Supreme Court decisions of Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948), and Fay v.
New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), both rejected cross section application while empha-
sizing that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was limited to the federal system.
However, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), in holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment right of jury trial in serious criminal cases is guaranteed to state defendants by
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, casts a questionable shadow on the
Fay and Moore analysis of the cross-section rule.
Furthermore, the extension of what was heretofore merely considered to be the
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Angeles County' 97 likewise fails to rebut the presumption of discrimina-
tion.'98
C. The Impact of Under-Representation Upon the
Mexican American
While the systematic exclusion which infests the Los Angeles County
selection process affords the keynote problem to the Mexican Ameri-
can, the social impact which the process wreaks is a problem of equally
pressing importance. Selection as a grand or petit juror presents the
sole opportunity for the average citizen to actively participate in the
administration of government.' 99 Jury service is a fundamental prerog-
ative of citizenship. 20 The opportunity to participate in government
through service as a grand or petit juror has been found to be of pro-
found psychological importance to minority persons.2 11 Studies have
shown that minority groups are more likely to feel they belong to the
community and society if they are available or called as jurors.
20 2
Such involvement has a profound impact on their attitude toward
law and the system of justice in this country.20 3  However, since
minorities are continuously excluded or greatly under-represented, their
confidence and trust in the government deteriorates, while, as "legal
outcasts," their sense of inferiority and alienation grows.2 °4 But the
importance of grand jury service takes on dimensions exceeding purely
application of the Court's supervisory power over the federal courts is by no means
unprecedented in the face of ineffective alternatives. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). In addition, the ninth circuit appears willing to extend the
cross section requirement to the states. See Carmical v. Craven, 451 F.2d 399, 403 (9th
Cir. 1971).
197. See text accompanying notes 165-176 supra.
198. Id.
199. 1970 STUDY, supra note 32, at 113.
200. Id.
201. Id. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 D= L.J. 19, 26. In an inter-
view with the only 1971 Mexican American grand juror, supra note 2, the same re-
sponse was revealed. The juror stated that
since I am on the grand jury the people from my area [East Los Angeles] feel
they have a voice, they feel terrific about my position. I feel there should always
be minorities on the grand jury if only to keep the conscience of the people
aware of minority feelings.
202. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 26; see generally 1970
STUDY, supra note 32, at 113.
203. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DEY L.J. 19, 26. The Mexican
American grand juror also echoed this response. "If Mexican Americans are not
represented [not only on the grand jury] the frustration level will increase and people
would find outlets. If people were represented they would feel they had an outlet."
Interview, supra note 2.
204. See generally 1970 STUDY, supra note 32, at 114.
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psychological consequences. A recent study by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, in particular reference to the Los Angeles
County grand jury, stated:
To the extent that the grand jury considers criminal cases, the pres-
ence of minority jurors minimizes the possibility that prejudice will af-
fect its deliberations or that laws will not be enforced to protect minor-
ity groups. Equally important for minority groups is the grand jury's
primary function of investigating and evaluating the administration of
local government and the actions of county and city officials. 205
It is not difficult to perceive how a grand jury which is conscious
of minority problems can prevent, punish, or mitigate official or pri-
vate misconduct toward minority groups. The grand jury possesses
the ability to address itself to common minority group complaints.2 °0
Furthermore, the grand jury has the power to indict anyone for crimes
against or affecting minority persons on its own initiative and without the
consent of the District Attorney.207  A conscious and vigilant grand
jury would exercise a significant influence in preventing or correcting
misconduct toward minorities.
V. CONCLUSION
The present method of nomination and selection to the Los Angeles
County grand jury has failed to provide a body representative of the
constitutionally protected Mexican American. Judge-selectors have
failed to respond to the growing numbers of this group in the com-
munity. Either they have not recognized the viability of the Mexican
American in Los Angeles, or they have neglected to take measures to
acquaint themselves with members of this group. It is axiomatic that a
substantial change must be made in the current nomination and selec-
tion procedures to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment dictates and social
realizations.
205. Id. at 113. The study continued:
The all encompassing nature of the grand jury's civil investigatory duties appears
strikingly from the 1967 Final Report of the Los Angeles County Grand Jury.
The Report contains commentary, frequently supplemented by criticism and spe-
cific recommendations, on such diverse subjects as: the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children welfare program; . . . proposals to install a cafeteria in, and
initiate admission fees for, the county museum; . . . debt collection practices of
a county hospital. . . and myriad other subjects. Id. at 113.
206. Id.
207. CAL. PEN. CoDE §§ 934-36 (West 1970). However, the sole Mexican Ameri-
can grand juror stated that the practicalities of the 1971 grand jury make these code
sections illusory. To initiate an investigation without the consent of the District
Attorney necessitates a majority vote of the grand jurors. On a topic con-
cerning a minority problem this could be almost impossible. Interview, supra note 2.
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Said change of course will not alleviate constitutional infirmities un-
less the practice of nomination by personal recommendation ceases, for
it has been established that unless a sustained effort is made by the se-
lectors to seek Mexican Americans for service, that class will continue to
be under-represented to a point prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It is recommended that the present procedure be replaced by a
random selection procedure similar to that outlined in the Uniform Jury
Selection and Service Act.2°0 The random selection procedure could be
administered by the jury commissioner and would require selection
drawings from every available source.20 9  The source lists so obtained
should also reveal the ethnic background of each prospective grand
juror. These lists would then be published and open to public record.
If the source lists were not truly representative of the community, various
interested groups could solicit lists for inclusion.
If subsequent events or studies indicate that some Mexican Americans
are unqualified for jury service because of an inadequate understanding
of the English language, the jury commissioner could call a higher
number of Mexican American persons to compensate for the English
language disability that eliminates some otherwise eligible grand
jurors. This procedure would ensure Mexican American representation
on the grand jury. However, an affirmative recognition of the race or
ethnic group in selecting a representative jury instills a constitutional
problem into the proposed remedy. In order to withstand judicial
scrutiny it must first be established that race or ethnic grouping is a rele-
vant consideration in the attempt to achieve and maintain the legally
valid end of a representative jury.210
208. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
modeled a Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act after the Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat. 54 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-69 (1970)). The policy of the Uniform Act is
that all persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair
cross section of the population of the area served by the court, and that all quali-
fied citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this Act to be considered
for jury service in this state and an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned
for that purpose. See McKusick & Boxer, Uniform Jury Selection and Service
Act, 8 H v. J. LEGIS. 280 (1971).
A recent California Senate Bill, S.B. No. 1420 (1971 Reg. Sess.), that would have
provided for such a random selection of grand jurors in California was defeated on
December 2, 1971. This bill would have amended CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 893, 895 and
896, and repealed §§ 897 and 899.
209. Sources should include voter registration, telephone, utility, and social se-
curity lists. Additional sources for minority groups could be obtained from minority
organizations such as the Mexican American Political Association, and also from wel-
fare rolls.
210. See Board of Educ. v. Swam, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) (school desegre-
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The Fourth Circuit has held, in Wanner v. County School Board of
Arlington,211 that it is absurd to insist that government bodies may
not consider race and racial balance in their attempts to remove the traces
of constitutionally invalid systems of discrimination.,12 And while
proportional limitation and intentional inclusion of a minority group
to grand jury service has been viewed as unconstitutional in Cassell
v. Texas,21 1 the inclusion condemned by the Cassell Court may be
said to have encouraged discrimination ("debilitative discrimination")
rather than to have alleviated discrimination ("ameliorative discrimina-
tion"). It appears that ameliorative discrimination was not meant
to be prohibited by that Court in light of its strong admonition against
racial discrimination.2 14  Thus, Cassell will not preclude attempts to
arrive at an ethnic or racial balance through a selection system which
takes race or ethnic origin into account.
21 5
Since the remedy proposed herein is in the nature of ameliora-
tive intentional inclusion rather than the proportional limitation de-
nounced by the Cassell Court, it should definitely withstand scrutiny.
Additionally, the very fact that Mexican Americans have been se-
gation): "Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating
a remedy." See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
19 (1971); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 232
(1969).
211. 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966).
212. Id. at 454. Wanner was a school desegregation case. The appellee, Board
of Education, attacked the desegregation plan arguing that the plan took race into con-
sideration in redrawing boundary lines. The court dismissed this contention stating:
It would be stultifying to hold that a board may not move to undo arrangements
artificially contrived to effect or maintain segregation, on the ground that this
interference with the status quo would involvb "consideration of race." When
school authorities, recognizing the historic fact that existing conditions are based
on a design to segregate the races, act to undo these illegal conditions--especially
conditions that have been judicially condemned-their effort is not to be frus-
trated on the ground that race is not a permissible consideration. This is not the
"consideration of race" which the Constitution discountenances. Id.
213. 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950) [discussed at text accompanying notes 187-198
supra].
214. This proposition was expounded in Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966),
a habeas corpus case wherein the petitioner asserted that purposeful inclusion of Negroes
in the grand jury which indicted him was a denial of equal protection. The court
denied his application and assertion while distinguishing Cassell:
The statements by Justices Reed, Frankfurter and Clark [in Cassell] . . . on
purposeful inclusion and selection totally without regard to race were all made in
the context of proportional limitation. They are neither a part of nor essential to
the Court's holding. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
215. The [Supreme] Court itself has never treated Cassell as a declaration
against conscious inclusion where this is essential to satisfy constitutional impera-
tives. Rather, it has been treated as a case of exclusion through a system of
limited inclusion. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
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verely under-represented indicates that affirmative action on the part
of the selectors may be the only means to correct this disparity.
Such action may also be supported by the expanding federal re-
quirement that a cross section of the community be taken into ac-
count in selecting the grand jury.216 If grand jury selectors are re-
quired to take a cross section of the community into account,217 they
must interpret "cross section" to mean various racial, ethnic, eco-
nomic, sociological and educational groups. As such, ethnic or racial
groups would have to be purposely included in any system of grand
jury selection which purports to obtain a constitutionally valid outcome.
Inclusion should, therefore, be both acceptable and encouraged where
its purpose is to obtain a body truly representative of the community.
Edward A. Villalobos
216. Id. at 14, wherein the Brooks court interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to
require that a fair cross-section of the community be taken into account when selecting
the grand jury. In order to attain this cross-section the court would require that the
jury selectors become acquainted with the community's human resources, i.e., significant
racial elements of the community. This could not be accomplished without a conscious
recognition of the elements' existence. Id.
217. See note 196 supra.
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